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Spatio-Temporal Analogies 
Paul Needham 
An assessment of the similarities and differences between space and time 
has played an important part in the development of the views of a number 
of philosophers about time.  Examples of statements about time are 
compared with allegedly corresponding statements about space to give us 
analogies and disanalogies according to whether the statements have the 
same or different truth values.  But now what are the general principles on 
which such comparisons are based?  In particular, according to what 
criteria are corresponding sentences paired off?  Are there any such general 
criteria?  And if so, do they already presuppose a substantial commitment 
to one or other of the points of view at issue where analogies and 
disanalogies are discussed? 
This paper is concerned with two specific proposals for criteria of 
correspondence, one which is rejected and the other tentatively advanced in 
its place.  The exchange between Richard Gale (1968, 1969) and James 
Garson (1969) resulted in a formulation of what I call the interchange 
criterion, the general idea of which is that correspondence is achieved by 
interchanging all temporal concepts for their spatial counterparts and vice 
versa in the original sentence.  This criterion has since received some 
currency (e.g. Hinckfuss 1975, Schlesinger 1975, 1980, and Shorter 1981).  
However, I think it is unacceptable as it stands. 
The point is developed in section I where it emerges, after attempting to 
resolve outstanding unclarities by considering how proponents of the 
-  380  - 
criterion try to apply it, that some restrictions are needed.  But the criterion 
thus restricted is far too narrow.  This is apparent from general 
considerations, and is illustrated in section II by reference to a well known 
example of Goodman’s, where a general criterion of correspondence 
developed along somewhat different lines is put forward.  It will by then be 
apparent, however, that the answer to the last question of the first 
paragraph, at least in reference to this new criterion, must be affirmative.  
But although the criterion can’t be used as a knock-down argument against 
those who see space and time as more or less incommensurable and deny a 
far-reaching similarity, it shows how interpretations of sentences can be 
found which don’t require us to think of time in terms of temporal 
becoming and suchlike, which I take to be the point of Garson’s criticism 
of Gale. 
1.  The Gale-Garson Interchange Criterion 
Richard Gale regards space and time as radically dissimilar and traces this 
view to disanalogies which hinge, so he contends, on distinctive features of 
temporal, as against spatial, indexicals.  These distinctive features are held 
to support his thesis of “the objectivity of temporal becoming”, of which 
there is no spatial counterpart, and thus to embody a fundamental source of 
disanalogy between space and time.  His notion of temporal becoming is 
not first independently explained and then brought in to support the 
disanalogies he adduces.  Rather, Gale claims to have a strategy for 
establishing the disanalogies, which turn, he maintains, on unique features 
of temporal indexicals; and temporal becoming is presented and 
understood in terms of these disanalogies. 
The following passage shows how Gale goes about constructing 
disanalogies. 
My next utterance of ‘now’ will denote a different time, even if I just 
wait where I am, but my next utterance of ‘here’ will not denote a 
different place unless I move about.  This difference between here and 
present or now is due to the fact that there is no spatial analogue to 
temporal becoming: the present (now), unlike here, shifts inexorably, 
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independently of what we do.  Every event later than the present will 
become present and every event earlier than the present did become 
present, to which the spatial analogue would be that every object in 
front (to the right, etc.) of me will occupy (become) here and every 
object in the rear (to the left, etc.) of me has occupied here.  But 
whereas the former is necessarily true the latter is contingent, and what 
is more is almost certainly false. (1968, pp. 214-5) 
Consider Gale’s first example.  He maintains that it is necessarily true 
that 
(1) My next utterance of ‘now’ will denote a different time (from now), 
whereas it is only contingently true that 
(2) My next utterance of ‘here’ will denote a spatial position different 
from here. 
The supposition of a disanalogy here depends upon the corresponding 
sentences (1) and (2) having different modal status.  Clearly, everything 
depends on the notion of a corresponding sentence, since only differences 
between corresponding sentences are relevant. 
James Garson has proposed what seem to be two reasonable conditions 
governing a corresponding sentence: (i) it should be the result of replacing 
every temporal concept by a corresponding spatial concept, and (ii) should 
spatial concepts occur in the original sentence, they must be replaced by 
corresponding temporal concepts in the corresponding sentence.  I refer to 
them jointly as the interchange criterion.  They leave open the question of 
what the spatial and temporal concepts, and their counterparts, are, which 
has to be decided before they can be applied.  The point of condition (ii) is 
that the sentence corresponding to the corresponding sentence is the 
original sentence, so that the correspondence relation is symmetric.  And 
symmetry is surely a necessary condition on any adequate criterion. 
Following Garson, we see by applying (i) to (1) that (2) is not in fact 
the corresponding sentence since the temporal concept ‘my next utterance’ 
has been ignored.  What we should have is rather something like 
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(3) The spatial position denoted by my utterance of ‘here’ which is 
closest to the right is different from here. 
But this is necessarily true if (1) is, and so there is no disanalogy. 
(The question of suppressed reference to space and time also arises in 
what might seem to be a better way of getting across the point of Gale’s 
first putative disanalogy.  Instead of (1), it might be said that 
(4) Two distinct utterances of ‘now’ will denote different times 
is necessarily true, whereas 
(5) Two distinct utterances of ‘here’ will denote different places 
is not.  But a moment’s reflection shows that this is wrong.  Two utterances 
of ‘now’ at the same time—by different people, or one written and the 
other spoken by the same person—would denote the same time.  And of 
course, two distinct utterances of ‘here’ by different people at the same 
time would denote different places.  The tacit assumption underlying the 
alleged necessary truth of (4) is that the distinction between the two 
utterances—by which we can understand sounds or visible signs—arises 
from their being made at different times.  But now although 
(6) Two utterances of ‘now’ at different times will denote different times 
is obviously necessarily true, so too is the corresponding 
(7) Two utterances of ‘here’ at different places will denote different 
places.) 
Similarly, Garson argues that the sentence corresponding 
to Gale’s second example, 
(8) Every event later than the present will become present and every 
event earlier than the present has become present, 
is not, as Gale suggests, 
(9)  Every object in front of me will occupy here and every object in the 
rear of me has occupied here, 
but rather 
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(10) Every object in front of me is here there (at a spatial position in front 
of me), and every object behind me is here there (at a spatial position 
behind me). 
Account has been taken here of the temporal reference implicit in the 
tenses of (8), and once again there turns out to be no disanalogy.  Both 
original and corresponding sentence have the same modal status.  (Actually 
both sentences are, I think, illicitly constructed in view of the attempt to 
iterate indexicals, the implications of which McTaggart has warned us.  
But I won’t labour the point here.) 
Garson’s criterion is thus sufficiently clear to show that the examples 
produced in The Language of Time do not suffice to establish a disanalogy 
between space and time as Gale had hoped.  But this has not been 
sufficient to deter Gale (see his 1969 paper) in the belief that spatio-
temporal disanalogies supporting his thesis can be found.  In the interests 
of generality, then, let us look again at how Garson applied his criterion to 
Gale’s examples and consider how the criterion might be sharpened. 
A source of vagueness hinted at above was the notion of spatial and 
temporal concepts and which are the counterparts of which.  This seems to 
present no real problem in the case of (1).  Obviously there is no temporal 
analogue of the three dimensionality of space, and this is not what Gale is 
seeking to establish.  Time is compared to a single spatial dimension; 
‘here’ is taken to be the spatial counterpart of ‘now’, and ‘closest to the 
right of’ is taken as the spatial counterpart of ‘next’. Clearly the example 
doesn’t suffice to show that there is a distinctive quality of temporal 
becoming which lacks a spatial counterpart.  The discussion of the second 
example is somewhat more controversial.  Gale takes the sentence (8), 
which is about events, to have a corresponding sentence about objects.  
Like many other authors,  Richard Taylor also shifts from talking about 
events to talking about objects, and vice versa, in his classic (1955) paper, 
although he manages on the whole to see analogies where Gale sees 
disanalogies.  It is by no means obvious, however, that such replacement is 
sanctioned by either of Garson’s two conditions since an event is neither a 
specifically spatial concept nor a specifically temporal concept.  Events 
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occur in a place at a time, and objects occupy places at times, so that it 
might be more appropriate to say that objects and events are spatio-
temporal concepts.  Gale’s manner of argument would then suggest that 
Garson’s two conditions can be supplemented with a third to the effect that 
spatio-temporal concepts be exchanged with their counterparts, and that 
events and objects are counterparts of one another.  No motivation is given 
for exchanges of spatio-temporal concepts in The Language of Time, 
however, and we will have to consider whether any can be given.  But I see 
no reason for interchanging objects and events. 
A decision on this last point was not necessary for the purpose of 
dealing with Gale’s second example since Garson’s point stands whether 
we stick with events and write as the sentence corresponding to (8)  
(11) Every event occurring in front of me is here at a spatial position in 
front of me ... 
or follow Gale and go over to talking about objects as in (10).  However, 
the examples of disanalogies put forward by Gale in his reply to Garson as 
an alternative defense of his thesis depend heavily upon the introduction of 
special notions like sortal-object and sortal-event together with an intricate 
discussion of what their correlates could be in corresponding sentences.  It 
would appear that the interchange criterion provides no guidelines for 
dealing with such cases, and that Gale is free to find cases involving 
concepts to which Garson’s (i) and (ii) do not apply.  There is clearly a 
danger here.  To allow the protagonist to keep the initiative in this way 
would be to accept that we don’t have a complete criterion of 
correspondence and are prepared to modify it, with whatever further 
complexities that may entail, in the light of additional types of concept as 
they crop up.  The antagonist’s strategy would be reduced to ad hoc 
skirmishes, whereas it would obviously be preferable to deal with the 
matter in the light of explicitly stated general principles.  To this end there 
is, it seems, something to be said for trying to restrict the interchange 
criterion so that all and only interchanges definitely sanctioned by Garson’s 
(i) and (ii) be carried out. 
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Actually, Gale seems to be doing just this.  Rather than thinking of 
objects as spatio-temporal concepts for the reason suggested above he 
maintains that “... a sortal-object is an essentially spatial concept” (1969, p. 
404), which would allow condition (ii) to come into play.  However, he 
goes on to argue that a sortal-event (an event terminating in an 
achievement), although a temporal concept, is not the temporal counterpart 
of a sortal-object.  He does this on the basis of the contention “that the 
concepts of here and now are not involved in an analogous way in our 
concept of a sortal-object” (loc. cit.).1  So he comes in the end to much the 
same view as I advocate, that objects (and presumably events) are not to be 
interchanged in corresponding sentences.  But he might not have done so if 
he didn’t also argue that events don’t happen to be counterparts of objects.  
This raises the problem that not much is really gained by confining 
ourselves to Garson’s two conditions so long as what falls within the 
mutually exclusive categories of spatial and temporal concepts, and what 
falls within related categories like that of spatio-temporal concepts to 
which the conditions don’t apply, is open to such divergent interpretations.  
Now, Gale and I needn’t dispute under which of these three headings 
objects and events are to be classified since, as we have just seen, we 
                                         
1 Gale would seem to be introducing the new idea here that analogies and 
disanalogies based on the comparison of sentences can be further used 
to support claims about which concepts are counterparts of which. 
Circularity threatens once results of the latter kind are used to support 
those of the former kind. 
He also seems to entertain the possibility that spatial (temporal) 
concepts may not have counterparts, thereby blocking the generation of 
corresponding sentences in putative analogies and, so he concludes, 
establishing a distinctive disanalogy.  It could well be maintained, 
however, that lack of a corresponding sentence argues equally against 
any disanalogy based on the original sentence, and indicates rather a 
divergence of views on such a scale as to preclude making any progress 
with his antagonist on the basis of the analogy-disanalogy strategy. 
-  386  - 
obtain our agreed result—certain details of the discussion aside2—by 
excluding them from all three categories.  But terms referring to parts of 
space, and predicates predicated of just such spatial referring terms, are 
surely spatial concepts, as temporal referring terms and purely temporal 
predicates are temporal concepts.  Garson’s conditions will then require, 
among other things, that spatial and temporal referring terms be 
interchanged in all contexts.  Spatio-temporal concepts are still with us, 
however, in the form of predicates true of n-tuples containing at least one 
temporal and one spatial referring term.  And as the discussion proceeds 
we will see that occurrences of such predicates of the kind ϕ(u1,...,ui,...,un) 
entailing that ui is a time (space) in the original sentence are fatal for 
Garson’s interchange criterion.  There is also the problem, in the general 
case, of specifying exactly which referring terms are to be exchanged for 
which.  But let us begin by considering Garson’s second condition. 
Is (ii) really relevant?  As Garson points out, he makes no use himself 
of (ii) in transforming an original into its corresponding sentence.  Perhaps 
there simply are no spatial concepts in any of the examples he discusses.  
However, bearing in mind that the central point of his argument was that 
temporal concepts are often not explicit, but that all of them must 
nevertheless be tracked down and exchanged for spatial concepts, we 
might well suspect that there are spatial concepts Garson has overlooked 
where Gale has overlooked temporal concepts.  So let us look at (1) again 
with this in mind. 
Garson’s application of his condition (i) to (1) seems to have been 
based on an analysis in terms of something like the predicate ‘utterance x 
occurring at time t1 denotes time t2’.  Sentence (3) is accordingly built up 
from a predicate ‘utterance x occurring in place p1 denotes place p2’ 
obtained by exchanging all occurrences of temporal concepts—time 
variables—for corresponding spatial concepts in the former predicate.  But 
now if an utterance can sometimes be said to occur at a time, and 
sometimes said to occur in a place, it is surely reasonable to say that 
                                         
2 See footnote 6, for example. 
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utterances always occur both in a place and at a time, even if it is not 
always necessary to draw attention explicitly to both of these features.  On 
this view what we have in both (1) and its corresponding sentence is 
something like the four-place predicate, ‘utterance x occurring in place p at 
time p denotes y’.  Availing ourselves of logical notation to make this more 
definite, let ‘O(x, p, t)’ stand for the predicate ‘x occurs in p at (during) t’ 
and ‘D(x)’ for the denotation function.  (1) can then be expressed as the 
truth that 
(12) ∀t (t is later than now & ∃x (x is an utterance of ‘now’)  &  O(x, p, t)  
.⊃  D(x) ≠ now), 
which holds for all places, p.  The corresponding sentence should then 
express a truth like 
(13) ∀p (p is to the right of here  &  ∃x (x is an utterance of ‘here’)  &  
O(x, p, t)  .⊃  D(x) ≠ here), 
and this holds for all times, t.  Seen in this light, the inexplicit spatial 
reference in (1) is a universal quantification over places. 
Although suppressed reference to space has been uncovered in 
obtaining (13) from (12), Garson’s criterion has not, however, actually 
been followed.  Occurrences of ‘“here”’ and ‘“now”’ have been 
interchanged, as have those of ‘here’ and ‘now’, but that is all.  In 
particular, there has been no interchange of the space and time variables p 
and t, nor did there seem any point in doing so.  These are surely examples 
of spatial and temporal concepts, but I don’t think there can be any 
question of interchanging them.  The result of interchanging space and time 
variables in ‘x occurs in p at (during) t’, i.e. ‘x occurs in t at (during) p’ is 
distinctly odd—either nonsense or, as some would prefer to say, always 
false, and some, necessarily false. 
Gale is at least aware of this peculiarity to which the interchange 
criterion gives rise.  Of many authors (e.g. Schlesinger 1975, Shorter 1981, 
Taylor 1955) who have discussed whether ‘An object cannot wholly 
occupy two places at the same time’ and ‘An object cannot wholly occupy 
two times at the same place’, or some such pair, constitute an analogy or a 
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disanalogy, Gale is the only one to react to what seems to me to be a clear 
symptom of non-correspondence in the second of these sentences.  “Before 
we ask”, he says, “whether this is a conceptual truth [which would give us 
an analogy on his account], we must ask what would be meant by an object 
‘wholly occupying a time at a space’—a most bizarre notion” (1969, p. 
399).  However, he seems to take this to mean that he is at liberty to “find 
some meaning for” the incomplete or defective expression he takes his 
criterion of correspondence to give him.  But this is tantamount to finally 
construing the corresponding sentence without resort to a general criterion 
of correspondence, which can’t be right.  The correct corresponding 
sentence simply can’t contain a bizarre spatio-temporal relation if the 
original doesn’t—this must be a condition of correspondence.  The only 
thing to be “found” is an analysis of the original sentence and the general 
criterion of correspondence should do the rest; otherwise, we are back to 
deciding correspondence from case to case again. 
A more charitable interpretation of these comments might be to 
construe Gale as trying to find a counterpart to the original spatio-temporal 
predicate which can then be predicated of the spatial and temporal referring 
terms taken in reverse order to give the corresponding sentence, even if it is 
difficult to reconcile with Garson’s criterion.  This interpretation is hardly 
borne out by his text, however, because it is doubtful that Gale succeeds in 
introducing a different notion as a counterpart to occupying a place at a 
time.  At one point he actually explains the sentence ‘An object cannot 
wholly occupy both now and then at the same region of space’ by saying 
This is a conceptual truth, because it means that it cannot be the case 
that an object occupies a given place now and at no other time and also 
occupies this place then, i.e. at some other time.  (Gale 1969, p. 406; 
my emphasis) 
And where he talks at other points about an object occupying a time at a 
place, the sense of the discussion indicates that he means occupying a place 
at (during) a time in the ordinary sense.  So it is doubtful whether any 
interchange is actually effected at all, even with respect to spatial and 
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temporal referring terms, within spatio-temporal predications in Gale’s 
examples. 
Now if spatio-temporal predicates were their own counterparts, the 
bizarre results of the interchange criterion would threaten to eliminate 
analogies involving such predicates wholesale.  For interchange of spatial 
and temporal referring terms would then simply convert true sentences 
containing such predicates into sentences nonsensical or false for general 
reasons of meaning.  (Hinckfuss’s example (1975, p. 81) from Maxwell’s 
theory, where from a given rate of change ∂x/∂t we can obtain an inverse 
rate of change ∂t/∂x with a different value, would seem to be an illustration 
of the exception rather than the rule.  We will see shortly how another of 
his examples fares distinctly less well under the same treatment.)  
Alternatively, spatio-temporal ‘core’ predicates (preserved in the 
corresponding sentence) might be stipulated to be symmetric with respect 
to the positions of space and time variables.  But now this runs dangerously 
close to eliminating disanalogies as impossibilities.  (Interchanging both 
spatial and temporal referring terms and spatio-temporal predicates ϕ for 
their converses—i.e. predicates ψ such that ψ(x, t, p) iff ϕ(x, p, t)—would, 
in the absence of such a stipulation, have the same effect.)  These pitfalls 
may go some way towards explaining why philosophers who profess to be 
following the interchange criterion frequently produce bizarre sentences 
when spatio-temporal predicates are involved.  But the fact remains that it 
is often difficult to see how they intend the application of the criterion to be 
understood whilst simultaneously comprehending what the result literally 
means; and the most sensible interpretation of the case in question often 
conforms to the strategy Gale was said at the end of the previous paragraph 
in fact to be following, namely to effect no interchange at all.  Consider, 
for example, a point on which Schlesinger takes issue with Hinckfuss. 
Hinckfuss (loc. cit.) maintains that “spatial movement seems to be 
within our control”, whereas “our movement through time seems to be 
inexorable”.  Schlesinger, on the other hand, maintains that 
Spatial movement is to be understood in terms of space covered during 
a certain amount of time   Obviously, then, for temporal movement to 
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be a counterpart of this, we have to speak of time being covered during 
a given amount of space.  (Schlesinger 1980, p. 127) 
But this is far from obvious.  ‘Cover’ is a verb we use to say that an object 
x traverses a stretch of space, p, during an interval of time t.  Let us write it 
C(x, p, t).  Schlesinger wants to say something like ‘We can cover t at p’ 
(his choice of preposition), and as an alternative to Hinckfuss’s talk of 
‘spatial movement’ and ‘movement through time’ we are offered the no 
less mysterious ‘covering of time at a space’.  In attempting to apply the 
interchange criterion both authors have allowed themselves to slip into 
intractable metaphors, the arbitrariness of which is reflected by the fact that 
one sees in the criterion a case for disanalogy where the other sees in the 
same criterion a case for an analogy.  It is certainly not the criterion of 
correspondence which carries the burden of the argument here.  
Schlesinger was right, I think, in beginning with a sentence explicitly based 
on the predicate C(x, p, t) rather than talking in tendencious metaphors 
from the outset.  But then he goes off into an unwarrantedly obscure 
description of the simple fact that we can often decide with what speed to 
cover a given distance, and which only obfuscates the fact that the 
corresponding sentence is in this case identical with the original.  No 
question of interchange arises, either of predicates (Hinckfuss?) or spatial 
and temporal referring terms (Schlesinger).  The problem with Hinckfuss’s 
example is the failure to make explicit a suppressed spatial reference in his 
original sentence, a sure symptom of which is the dubious metaphors we 
otherwise seem to be stuck with. 
A similar case where Hinckfuss and Schlesinger have diverging 
opinions should be dealt with, I think, along the same lines.  Space, 
according to Hinckfuss (p. 90), is transparent to light whereas it doesn’t 
even make sense to speak of an interval of time as transparent.  But 
Schlesinger sees “no conceptual barrier in applying these terms 
[‘transparent’ and ‘opaque’] to temporal intervals” (1980, p. 14).  His 
strategy in this case, however, is to draw a space-time diagram which he 
then rotates through 90° to obtain another diagram which he thinks can be 
given a physical interpretation and thus yield a corresponding sentence.  
-  391  - 
This ‘rotation criterion’, according to which the original sentence is 
represented by lines drawn on a space time diagram which is then rotated 
through 90° and a physical interpretation of the result found which is held 
to give us the corresponding sentence, is a device frequently employed by 
proponents of the interchange criterion (cf. Hinckfuss 1975, pp. 66-9; 
Shorter 1981, pp. 71-5).  Unfortunately it is never really discussed exactly 
what relation the device is supposed to bear to the interchange criterion, 
what restrictions, if any, the original sentence imposes on the 
interpretations allowed in obtaining the corresponding sentence from the 
rotated diagram, and even when the device should and when it shouldn’t be 
employed.  In the present case, however, it suffices to say that light’s 
traversing a medium or space during a period of time (without dispersion), 
which is what transparency comes down to, is equally about temporal 
intervals as about stretches of space and so doesn’t give us a property of 
space time lacks.  Original and corresponding sentence are again identical. 
I have argued that what plausibility there is in Garson’s conditions 
depends on incomplete paraphrase and consequent failure to appreciate 
their full implications.  When are interchanges allowable, then?  No 
objection has been raised to interchanges such as those involved in the first 
conjuncts of the antecedents of (12) and (13), where interchange of spatial 
and temporal referring terms is simultaneously accompanied by an 
interchange of purely temporal and corresponding purely spatial predicates.  
The objection was to simultaneously accompanying changes of spatio-
temporal predicates, of which no one seems to have made any good sense, 
but equally to interchanges of temporal and spatial referring terms within 
spatio-temporal predications without change of the predicate.  Why not, 
then, simply restrict interchange to purely spatial and purely temporal 
predicates and what they are predicated of, conforming with what, on a 
charitable interpretation, is the actual practice of proponents of the 
interchange criterion?  The result may be no change at all.  The 
corresponding sentence would then be identical with the original, which is 
often, as the discussion of the Hinckfuss-Schlesinger disagreements 
illustrate, just the result we want.  This won’t do, however.  The examples 
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considered so far are so simple as to constitute special cases.  What is to be 
done where the original sentence involves several spatio-temporal 
predications?  In general, some sort of change of spatial and temporal 
referring terms in spatio-temporal predications may be required.  A more 
complex example must be considered in order to bring out the relevant 
features, and an often discussed example of Goodman’s will serve this 
purpose nicely. 
2.  Goodman’s Example 
“Two things may approach and then recede from each other in space”, 
Goodman (1951, p. 300) says, “... but ... never become nearer and then 
further apart in time”.  I disagree with Goodman that there is a disanalogy 
to be had here, and in so doing agree with Schlesinger’s result (1980, pp. 4-
5).  But I don’t see how the references Schlesinger makes to the graph he 
draws show how the case conforms either to his criterion of abstracting to 
common continuum features or to the interchange criterion, which are the 
two criteria of correspondence he wants to motivate.  (For some reason he 
is not tempted to rotate the space time diagram in this case.  It may have 
been some such consideration which led Goodman to his conclusion.)  I 
will proceed by first offering as intuitively plausible a treatment of this 
particular case (with the result just mentioned), and then formulating the 
procedure involved in general terms as a criterion of correspondence.  This 
is followed by some comments on the assumptions involved. 
The original sentence contains an open sentence of the kind ‘x is 
spatially nearer y at t2 than at t1, and then further apart at t3 than at t2’, the 
variables being bound by existential quantifiers in the original.  This open 
sentence can be analysed as the conjunction of 
(14) At t1, x occupies place p1 and y place p2  &  at t2, x occupies place p3 
and y place p4  &  at t3, x occupies place p5 and y place p6, 
and 
(15) t2 is between t1 and t3  &  the spatial interval between p3 and p4 is less 
than both that between p1 and p2 and that between p5 and p6. 
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Abbreviating ‘occupies’ with ‘O’, (14) is just 
(14a) [O(x, p1, t1) & O(y, p2, t1)]  &  [O(x, p3, t2) & O(y, p4, t2)]   
&  [O(x, p5, t3) & O(y, p6, t3)], 
What is the corresponding sentence?  Restricting interchange to (15), 
i.e. the purely temporal and the purely spatial predications, is obviously 
inadequate.  But replacing each occurrence of t1, ..., t3 by p1, ..., p3, 
respectively, and the original p1, ..., p6 by t1, ..., t6, respectively, here and in 
the quantificational prefix, would involve the bizarre notions discussed 
towards the end of the last section.  t1, ..., t6 in the corresponding sentence 
must somehow be determined by p1, ..., p3 analogous to the way p1, ..., p6 
were determined by t1, ..., t3 in the original.  What corresponding change in 
(14a) is required?  This I’ve tried to indicate by the formulation of (14), 
and the square bracketing in (14a) which groups open sentences dealing 
with different places at the same time.  The open sentence corresponding to 
(14a) should deal analogously with the same place at different times.  The 
corresponding open sentence is thus the conjunction of 
(16) [O(x, p1, t1) & O(y, p1, t2)] & [O(x, p2, t3) & O(y, p2, t4)]  
& [O(x, p3, t5) & O(y, p3, t6)] 
and 
(17) p2 is between p1 and p3  &  the temporal interval between t3 and t4 is 
less than both that between t1 and t2 and that between t5 and t6. 
The corresponding sentence is then formed from this open sentence by 
binding all the variables with existential quantifiers, and is true just in case 
the original sentence is. 
A general procedure for converting original to corresponding sentence 
in line with this treatment of Goodman’s example can be formulated as 
follows.  Assuming the original is formulated in a three-sorted first-order 
language with spatial and temporal variables (ranging over distances and 
durations as parts of space and time) and individual variables, let Q* be Σ 
when Q is ∃, and Q* be Π when Q is ∀, and work through the atomic 
formulas ϕ from left to right.  If ϕ contains no temporal variables and pi1, 
..., pin are all its spatial variables, rewrite them as ti1, ..., tin, respectively.  
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Then replace any occurrence of Qpij binding this occurrence of pij in ϕ by 
Q*tij, for 1 ≤ j ≤ n.  Similarly if ϕ contains only temporal variables.  If pi 
and tj both occur in ϕ, change pi to pj and tj to ti, and then change any 
occurrence of Qpi binding this occurrence of pi in ϕ to Q*ti, and of Qtj 
binding this occurrence of tj in ϕ to Q*pj.  Finally, change all occurrences 
of ‘Σ’ to ‘∃’ and of ‘Π’ to ‘∀’.3 
A number of details here need to be examined.  First, no predicate 
letters are changed at all as the procedure stands.  But although the gist of 
the discussion in the last section was to restrict changes of predicates, 
nothing quite so sweeping was envisaged nor really need be introduced 
here.  It was assumed there that purely spatial (temporal) predicates do 
have corresponding purely temporal (spatial) counterparts.  These might be 
enumerated in a list and the corresponding changes incorporated into the 
procedure.  Champions of the incommensurability of space and time may 
object to every item of the list.  But if like Gale their intent is to establish 
this thesis on the strength of disanalogies, some independent positive 
argument would be required for discounting what seem to be natural 
counterparts.  Gale has not himself reacted in this way to examples like 
those mentioned in the previous section, but seems on the contrary to want 
to follow suit—cf. (8) and (9).  It wouldn’t be correct to argue, then, that 
the sentence ‘Times are composed of instants’ couldn’t give rise to an 
analogy because replacing ‘times’ by ‘spaces’ yields the contradictory 
‘Spaces are composed of instants’ (cf. Hinckfuss 1975, pp. 63-4).  No 
analogy can be based on this particular comparison, of course, but that 
would hardly justify the conclusion that it is impossible to draw an 
analogy.  The corresponding sentence is ‘Spaces are composed of points’, 
whether ‘is composed of’ is taken as a distinct counterpart of the 
corresponding predicate in the original sentence or the same predicate. 
                                         
3 The special cases discussed in section I where original and 
corresponding sentences were said to be identical would, on this 
criterion, only be identical up to logically equivalent rearrangements of 
existential or universal quantifiers in the prefix. 
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Revising the procedure along these lines is, perhaps, at odds with the 
train of thought underlying the thesis Schlesinger develops in his 1975 
article, that spatio-temporal analogies reflect common continuity features.  
This thesis does seem to require abstracting to common predicates, so that 
the example of Hinckfuss’s just mentioned, for instance, might on this 
view be represented as ‘Times contain parts which don’t themselves 
contain parts’, yielding the corresponding sentence by simply replacing 
‘times’ with ‘spaces’.  The original sentence here is now one entailed by, 
but which doesn’t entail, the original example.  Surreptitious switching of 
examples (not unknown in this debate— cf. Schlesinger’s changing of 
Hinckfuss’s example about spatial movement) shouldn’t, perhaps, be 
considered fair play.  However, there may sometimes be a point in 
explicitly changing the example by weakening in the light of the general 
correspondence procedure.  Consider (12) again, where ‘later than’ was 
changed in the corresponding sentence to ‘to the right of’.  Why not change 
it to ‘to the left of’ instead?  There is a measure of arbitrariness in 
establishing counterparts here which suggests that the substantial point at 
issue in Gale’s example could be more precisely located by changing the 
example.  Reformulation of the original in terms of betweenness, or more 
conveniently in terms of the mereological predicate ‘is separate from’ 
would make it clear, at least to the satisfaction of Gale’s opponent, that the 
direction of time (which, he grants, can be brought out by disanalogies 
involving causation, for example) is not the point of this particular 
example. 
Second, it is assumed that spatio-temporal predicates contain only one 
temporal and one spatial variable.  A modification of this implausible 
assumption accommodating spatio-temporal predicates with equal numbers 
of spatial and temporal variables is easily introduced.  Whether this 
restriction on spatio-temporal predicates can always be insisted upon I 
don’t know.  This implies a corresponding uncertainty about how generally 
applicable the criterion is. 
Third, returning to an earlier theme, reference to individuals, be they 
material objects, events, or parts in one sense or another of objects and 
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events, remains unchanged.  As I have said, I don’t see any good reason for 
making any such changes; and it is difficult to see that those philosophers 
who do advocate such changes in particular cases are being guided by a 
general criterion in doing so.  To illustrate with just one example, 
Schlesinger (1980, pp. 12-3) argues that if an object such as a television set 
is broken into spatial components by removing, say, its entire front part, 
the resulting objects are very different from the original whole functioning 
system.  However, when we divide such objects “into their component 
temporal parts, the resulting systems are merely shorter versions of the 
original whole”.  Schlesinger goes on to argue that this doesn’t establish a 
disanalogy because of the existence of counterparts showing just the 
opposite kind of asymmetry.  “A counterpart in the relevant sense to a 
particular such as a complex machine would be, for example, a symphony 
heard throughout an extended region of space and time”.  Chopping off the 
last movement would change the character of the event, whereas reducing 
its spatial extent would leave us with the same symphony.4  But now 
Schlesinger didn’t talk of events moving as the situation corresponding to 
objects covering space in time in the example discussed towards the end of 
the last section, but rather continued to talk of objects.  When is it 
appropriate (permissible, necessary) to introduce events as the counterparts 
of objects and when not on his view?  Inconsistency of this sort shows that 
what Schlesinger has in mind cannot be a correspondence procedure of the 
kind outlined in this section supplemented with the directions to 
interchange ‘is an object’ with ‘is an event’, and ‘occupies’ with ‘occurs’. 
This case might be alternatively described by (saying Schlesinger is 
surreptitiously) changing the original sentence to one involving existential 
quantification over individuals which are either objects or events, and 
which happens to be satisfied by the television set which is broken.  No 
                                         
4 Schlesinger’s original sentence is more complicated than might at first 
appear, involving several concepts which have not yet been explicitly 
introduced, and further assumptions about some which have.  See the 
appendix for a discussion. 
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interchange of references to objects and events would then be involved in 
obtaining the corresponding sentence, even though the corresponding 
sentence happens to be satisfied by an event. 
Finally, the criterion as stated only allows change of variables.  It could 
be extended to indexicals by stipulating the replacement of ‘now’ by ‘here’ 
and ‘then’ by ‘there’ in purely temporal predicates, and conversely for 
purely spatial predicates.  Spatio-temporal predicates ϕ(x, α, β) would be 
rewritten ϕ(x, γ, δ), where γ is here, there or pi according as β is now, then 
or ti, with a corresponding change of quantifiers as before where 
appropriate, and conversely for δ and α.  We must add to the list of 
interchangeable counterparts the predicate pair ‘is an utterance of “now”’ 
and ‘is an utterance of “here”’, and a similar pair for ‘“then”’ and ‘“there”’.  
This then sets us thinking about dates and names of places.  But I can’t see 
any substantial point in talking about counterparts here.  This is a question 
best dealt with by not allowing it to arise, requiring that original sentences 
be construed in an appropriately general form. 
This criterion has not been devised to capture what, in allusion to 
McTaggart, is sometimes called the A-theorist’s understanding of time, and 
could hardly be used to dissuade such a philosopher of his conviction that 
time is really incommensurable with space.  He would probably object to 
the very use of time variables, and we might never reach agreement over 
the analysis of original sentences.  But it offers a strategy for dealing with 
ordinary language sentences the A-theorist might offer in support of his 
view, showing that his interpretations are not obligatory.  Garson began 
along this path, but stopped short of the goal.  I hope at least to have 
brought this end more clearly into view.5 
Appendix 
Schlesinger’s example about the television set which is broken into spatial 
parts can be approached as follows.  It no longer involves comparison of 
                                         
5 I am grateful to George Berger, George Schlesinger and members of 
the Departmental seminar at Stockholm for many useful comments. 
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time with a single spatial dimension, and spatial variables should now be 
thought of as ranging over (continuous) regions considered as parts of 
space.  Now, suppose ‘part of’ between individuals is defined by the 
equivalence 
P(x, y, t)  ≡  ∃p1 ∃p2 (O(x, p1, t) & O(y, p2, t) & p1 ⊂ p2), 
where ‘⊂’ is the mereological relation ‘part of’ and ‘O’ stands for 
‘occupies’.  (The defining condition here is in fact only necessary; we 
wouldn’t ordinarily allow arbitrary parts of the spatial region occupied by 
an object to define parts of the object.  But I don’t want to make this 
discussion more involved than it already is.)  Two regions p1, p2 abut—
written A(p1, p2)—iff they are separate and there is a region overlapping 
both but not any other region separate from both (i.e. p1|p2 & ∃q (Ov(q, p1) 
& Ov(q, p2) & ∀r (r|p1 & r|p2 .⊃ r|q)), where ‘|’ is mereological separation 
and ‘Ov’ mereological overlapping).  Abutment between individuals can 
then be defined by the equivalence 
A(x, y, t)  ≡  ∃p1∃p2 (O(x, p1, t) & O(y, p2, t) & A(p1, p2)). 
An individual x can now be said to be connected at t—C(x, t)—if any two 
parts y, z of x are identical with the first and last members of some 
sequence x1, ..., xn of abutting parts of x at t (i.e. A(x1, x2, t), A(x2, x3, t), 
etc.).  Connectedness at t is a necessary condition of identity at t for many 
individuals, perhaps all.  This is particularly difficult to decide in the case 
of events because of the difficulty in demarcating the region occupied by 
an event (which I assume is the region in which it occurs).  Consider a 
garden party, for instance; does this occupy the garden or just the 
mereological sum of the disparate regions occupied by individual guests?  
If every guest can hear the guests in his/her immediate neighbourhood, 
perhaps this suffices for connectedness; but then where is the boundary to 
be drawn?  Perhaps an event occupies a region with the smallest boundary 
satisfying such conditions.  However, Schlesinger’s original sentence 
concerned an object, and this can now be formulated as 
 ∃x (object(x) & ∃t1 ∃t2 (t1|t2 & C(x, t1) & ∃y ∃z (P(y, x, t1) & P(z, x, t1) 
& –∃w (P(y, w, t2) & P(z, w, t2) & C(w, t2))))). 
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The criterion gives us the following corresponding sentence 
 ∃x (object(x) & ∃p1 ∃p2 (p1|p2 & C(x, p1) & ∃y ∃z (P(y, x, p1) &  
P(z, x, p1) & –∃w (P(y, w, p2) & P(z, w, p2) & C(w, p2))))), 
where C(x, p) and P(x, y, p) are defined analogously (according to the 
correspondence criterion) to C(x, t) and P(x, y, t).  The spatial part-of 
relation P(x, y, p) is straightforward; it just means that x occupies the same 
place as y for part of the time.  (For stationary objects this obviously means 
x = y, and I would say the same of events; I’ll come to moving objects 
shortly.)  Spatial abutment A(x, y, p) just means that x and y occupy the 
same place at some abutting times.  ‘C(x, p)’ is a longer tale, and leads me 
to be more definite about the interpretation of ‘O’. 
Whereas events are changes and don’t themselves change—at any rate, 
they don’t move (cf. Dretske 1967)—objects do move, and this makes the 
interpretation of O(x, p, t) when x is an object more complicated.  I 
interpret it in accordance with the principle that p is the sum total of 
regions, neither more nor less, covered (occupied) by x at some time during 
t.  (The predicate C(x, p, t) introduced in connection with the discussion of 
what Hinckfuss and Schlesinger say about covering space at the end of 
section I thus becomes a special case of O(x, p, t).)  If x is, for instance, a 
car driving along a road during t, p is the volume swept out along the road 
between the place where the rear bumper is at the beginning of t and the 
place where the front bumper is at the end of t.  Another car driving in the 
same direction but further along the road and within this volume at the 
beginning of t would occupy a space including a proper part of p during t.  
But it couldn’t occupy p during a part of t, even if moving in the opposite 
direction and beginning at the other end of p—it would have to side-step.  
So P(x, y, p) implies x = y quite generally.  An individual x, object or event, 
wholly occupies a region at a time, so that O(x, p, t) implies –O(x, q, t) for 
all proper parts q of p, although proper parts of x may occupy proper parts 
of p at t.  And if t1  is a proper part of t and O(x, p, t), then x could occupy 
some proper part of p during t1  
‘C(x, p)’ means that any two spatial parts, y, z, of x are the first and last 
members of some sequence of spatially abutting parts of x.  The members 
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of this sequence are all identical with x (being spatial parts), as we have 
just seen, and A(x, x, p) is true iff x is stationary at p during some time 
(assuming time is infinitely divisible, i.e. any time is divisible into abutting 
pairs).  ‘C(x, p)’ therefore boils down to ‘x is stationary at p during some 
time’.  The corresponding sentence, then, is satisfied by objects that are 
permanently stationary but which may occasionally wobble, though never 
so much as to occupy two separate regions (at different times).  For such an 
object x occupying p1  at some time there are objects y, z (= x) occupying 
p1  which are not identical with any object w occupying another (separate) 
place p2   Objects that move sufficiently to occupy non-overlapping regions 
falsify the sentence.  Now the identification of the same place at different 
times would seem to require the existence of more or less stationary 
objects, but whether they must fulfill such strict conditions as to satisfy the 
corresponding sentence and give us an analogy is not so obvious. 
It is interesting to consider what would be the case if we talked of 
events rather than objects.  I interpret ‘occupy’ in accordance with 
Dretske’s stipulation that “it is false to locate an event at a position at 
which only part of the event occurs” (1967, p. 488).  This extends what 
was said above about events wholly occupying a region at a time, for if x 
is, say, an allday party at which guests wandered in both the house and the 
garden, t the time between lunch and tea when everybody was in the 
garden, p, then O(x, p, t) is false.  We avoid in this way the absurd result 
that events move, e.g. from the house to the garden.6  Understanding the 
region occupied by an event x as the region in which it occurs in this way 
gives us a simple interpretation of O(x, p, t).  The original sentence is then 
true because, assuming events are connected at some time (see above), all 
events are such that what are parts of them at one time cannot be parts of 
another event occurring at another time.  (Whereas parts of an object at one 
                                         
6 This is to dispute Gale’s claim, concerning his example of a basketball 
game the first half of which is played in p at t1 and the second half in a 
different place q at t2, that “the game-event wholly occcupies p during 
t1 and wholly occupies q during t2.”  (1969, p. 404; my notation). 
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time might not all be part of a single, connected object at another time, 
parts of an event at one time can’t even be parts of an event at a different 
time.)  However, C(x, p) is always false where x is an event because A(x, x, 
p) is always false, no event occupying anywhere at two distinct times.  
Thus, the corresponding sentence is false and we have a disanalogy. 
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